Independent Judgment

Pundits are writing on the Internet that Judge Michael McVey’s opinion filed nearly a month ago with the Maricopa County Superior Court sounds the death-knell for the medical marijuana industry in Arizona. No landlord will make a lease accepting the risk of not getting paid by its tenant on the basis that the federal government will wholesale begin to enforce its Controlled Substances Act. Before folks head for the exits of this vaudeville show, however, they may find the independence principle instructive.
Judge McVey ruled in the case of HAMMER v. TODAY’S HEALTH CARE II (CV 2011-051310, filed April 17, 2012) that a half million dollars of loans could not be recovered by the lenders from the medical marijuana business principals to whom the loan was extended. Court records show Michele Rene Hammer and Mark Haile in August 2010, each agreed to lend Today’s Health Care II $250,000 to finance a “retail medical-marijuana sales and growth center.” You can read a bit more of the facts on the Arizona Republic’s Website on the story at http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012/05/08/20120508arizona-medical-pot-ruling-may-reverberate.html#ixzz1urXWGCcj.
Judge McVey ruled that since, under federal law medical marijuana is illegal to possess or sell, the purpose of the loan, to open a dispensary and grow site, was illegal also. A contract for an illegal purpose is not enforceable; this is the common law general rule in most states. In addition, although the parties did not address this argument to the court, Judge McVey held that the lenders could not recover their loan funds through equitable theories like unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel. While the latter theory might make the promise enforceable, McVey ruled, it would be illegal for the promise to be enforced.

Several bloggers have read this opinion, which may be challenged before the Court of Appeals (there are exceptions to the general rule that a contract for illegal ends is unenforceable, especially when the result of “voidness” violates a fundamental public policy of the state), as meaning that a landlord cannot count on receiving its rent, and that a tenant cannot be ensured that the landlord will not evict the tenant summarily during the lease term on the grounds that continued occupancy by a medical marijuana business is illegal. (The latter event is especially weird since essentially every astute landlord now knows this fact.)

I can’t help tenants here, but one thought that occurs to me for landlords is that they can require a different route of payment than just depending on a mailed check. (Cash would be good, sure, if you’re a landlord, but that’s not what I mean.) Typically, however, accepting a year or two’s worth of rent (assuming a tenant could afford this “nut”) in advance is a violation of the landlord’s covenant not to do this found in the landlord’s security documents (when landlords have leveraged their property). But a landlord has additional options here. One I focus on here is the irrevocable standby letter of credit. A medical marijuana business operator can pay a willing bank, upon application, to post a letter of credit as enhancement for the tenant’s promise to pay rent. If the standby letter of credit is “clean and evergreen,” meaning that the bank will require little in the way of demonstrating the tenant’s default and the letter of credit will renew automatically for the duration of the lease term, then the landlord will be able to go to the bank, make a claim under the letter of credit, and get paid its delinquent rent upon doing nothing more than providing a letter on its letterhead confirming that the rent is delinquent.

Enter the independence principle. When the tenant-applicant pays the fee of the bank for the issuance of the letter of credit, their relationship is confined to the obligation of the bank to perform under the terms of the letter of credit. The letter of credit, when the terms of same have been agreed upon between the issuing bank and the landlord, becomes a contract between the two latter parties to which the tenant is not a party. The bank must, however, collect the premium for the letter of credit for its duration, in advance, to hedge against the chance it cannot get reimbursement from the applicant-tenant. This means that the tenant is going to have to produce some serious cash if it wants to induce the bank to issue the letter of credit in favor of the landlord as that instrument’s beneficiary.

So, while a lease may be illegal between a landlord and tenant and thus the rent obligation is not enforceable against the tenant, it is not illegal for the bank and the prospective landlord to sign a contract under which a landlord may get paid in the event of a third party’s default. Because that contract is independent of the lease, the independence principle protects the landlord from having to “eat” unpaid rent loss. This is the message of Article 4 of the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits version 600 (2007), which landlords will want to govern the letter of credit’s interpretation and enforcement. The bank gets to generate fees for letter of credit issuance; and the landlord doesn’t have to collect any rent before the moment of a delinquency in an installment. This program allows the landlord to dodge the mortgage bullet from its lender who doesn’t want the landlord pocketing long green and concealing this fact from the lender. The lender can take a security interest in the letter of credit proceeds payable for its beneficiary’s benefit should a default occur.

Mellow Annoyances and Foreclosure Sanity

You’ll notice, because I insist, the annoying horizontal bar in the left margin of this blog page. It advertises the availability of my new book, Joint Tenancies: Landlords and Medical Marijuana Businesses. It’s 10 bucks for the e-book version. I’ll sell you a paper copy for 5 bucks more, but you’ve got to leave a comment in the box below so I know how to reach you, or send an email to my law firm email address. The product description is on the landing page you can reach from the annoying horizontal bar.

The Supreme Court restored some order late last week by publishing its trust deed foreclosure decision in BT CAPITAL v. TD SERVICE COMPANY (May 4, 2012). The Court of Appeals opinion (which I blogged on earlier here) was vacated in favor of simplier sanity. The Supreme Court said that trustee’s sales are creatures of statute, not of common law, so that the inquirer must read the statutes to understand the applicable rules. The pertinent statute to the appeal, A.R.S. Sec. 33-810(A), says a trust deed non-judicial sale is over when the trustee sings – specifically, when the trustee collects from the high bidder the price bid “in a form satisfactory to the trustee.” If the trustee doesn’t accept the payment, even if it should, then the sale isn’t final.

In this case, the trustee TD acted like a corporate knucklehead (didn’t follow the explicit instructions of the trust deed beneficiary, among other things) but it formally rejected the payment of the bid price from one of the trustee’s sales tendered by BT Capital. So, said the court, whether TD is liable to BT Capital for damages is a different issue from whether BT had ownership rights in the property that was auctioned, then auctioned some more.

The Supreme Court also pointed out that the trustee’s sale statutes don’t allow a third party to assert claims for breach of contract against the trustee or its principal, the beneficiary. So there you have it: If you want satisfaction as a stakeholder in the foreclosure process, make sure you understand, follow, and encourage others to follow the state’s statutes in this area. Avoid the smoke of confusion and costly, uncertain litigation.

Why things don’t work like they used to?

I remember when the lawn mower was a Dangerous Machine. When I was growing up, I got paid to mow the lawn if I had been doing well in school. Bad grades, I still had to mow but I didn’t get paid. The Lawn Mower was … fun. It was a self-propelled monster with a huge engine on top, and I got to pour gasoline in it and start it up by myself. It was exciting to mow. Really.

As I got older, the thrill wore off, but I still own a lawn mower. But my mower just isn’t the Lawn Mower I remember. See, the engines are not as powerful due to EPA regulations. They don’t move as fast because they might get away from you. And they don’t suck up leaves and grass and put it in the basket as well, because the skirt has to come down almost to the ground to keep you from lopping off your toes.

I do have a lawn mower injury story. I was mowing the lawn, wearing tennis shoes. I shut off the mower and was taking the grass catcher off, and turned to carry it to the trash. My heel caught under the lip of the mower skirt and I cut my heel, pretty badly. The mower wasn’t even running. This, on a government approved mower.

So we can blame the likes of the nanny state for why our mowers are no good. What else can we attribute to nanny politics? Light bulbs that contain mercury, cost more, and take several minutes to reach full brightness; shower heads that don’t put out enough water to take a decent shower; water savers ON THE SPOUT FOR THE BATHTUB so that you have to wait so long for the tub to fill that the water is cold by the time it is full. REALLY????

How about spas that limit the temperature so you don’t cook yourself; cars that beep at you until you comply with all state and federal regulations… the list is endless!

I am at heart an engineer, and I am bothered by how things get regulated. I am similarly, and for the same reasons, bothered when my wife comes home with another trinket, be it a plastic plant that dances in the sunshine or a new piece of furniture. Alright, I am not really bothered. Much. I know I have worse habits.

See, in queueing theory we learn that if the rate at which things arrive in a queue is the same as the rate that things depart from the queue, then the ultimate length of the queue is infinite. What does that mean? It means that if you buy stuff and bring it in the house without throwing an equal amount away, the house will ultimately explode from having too much stuff in it.
Similarly, if our elected officials in Washington and our local states continue to write legislation without voiding other existing legislation, then ultimately every single aspect of our lives will be regulated in some way.

I travel through a local intersection on a regular basis. I remember when, in that intersection, you could turn left on green. At some point they changed it so you had to wait for the green arrow. It is a long light, so this change was annoying — after all, in the name of safety, my commute was extended by at least a minute or two. (It adds up when you consider how many cars sit and idle in that intersection waiting for the arrow)

So I called the City and talked to the traffic engineer.

“So I noticed that you changed the protocol at this intersection so you can’t turn left on green anymore”.
– “Yes, there was an accident, so we changed it.”
“Do you change the protocol in every intersection when there is an accident where someone is turning left on green?”
– “Yes, because we don’t want to get sued.”
“So that means that eventually there will not be any intersection in the entire city where anyone can turn left on green.”
– “Huh? How do you figure that?”

See, it is the queueing theory thing. There is no mechanism to undo the thing, but there is a mechanism to do the thing, so eventually everything will be in the “do” state. All the lights will require turn arrows. And over the past 5-8 years, that is exactly what has happened. Left on green intersections are all but a memory.

Congress is now passing laws without even reading them. They pass laws about things they know nothing about. They pass laws with severe unintended consequences. Just stop it!

We need a new law! We need a law that says, that for every new piece of legislation that is passed, the same number of pages, plus 10%, of old legislation must be voided. That way, we beat out the queueing theory problem. And maybe we would get to keep light bulbs and lawn mowers that work. Heck, we might even be able to do away with entire government agencies. Now there’s an idea that has merit!

–PLH

Short sales, Foreclosures, and liens

By now we all know that a short sale is a transaction in which a property is sold for less than the amount owed to the lien holders. In Arizona, the usual course of business is to write a promissory note, which is evidence of the debt (some states still use mortgages, which are different). Then, a Deed of Trust is recorded (the note is sometimes, but not always recorded; there is no recording requirement for any of this) which established rights of the holder of the promissory note to cause a foreclose if the terms of the note are not followed.

When someone does not pay, the holder of the note tells the trustee (the holder of the trust deed) to initiate foreclosure proceedings to get the property back. The first thing the trustee does, in the course of proceeding to foreclosure, is to notify anyone who has an interest in the property. How do they figure this out? They look in the records at the county recorder’s office.

This became of interest to me recently, because a client told me that, while there were two conventional lenders involved with his property (two banks), there was also a 3rd, private party, who had a note naming his home as security. I looked in the records at the county recorder and could find no evidence of this note. Further, my client told me that the 3rd lien holder was surprised to learn that the property was facing foreclosure, as he had not been notified in any official way.

So what happens when either a short sale is completed and closed, or a foreclosure occurs, and there is an outstanding, unrecorded lien? Of course I turned to my fellow blogger and attorney Mr. Widener, who writes:

The validity of a note is not determined by recording. A lien has to be recorded in order to give notice to title searchers. A lien is still valid as between the grantor and its grantee if not recorded, but non-recordation would divest the lienholder of its ability to upset a foreclosure. Non recording of the lien likely makes it possible to estop the lienholder from overturning the short sale, also. A bona fide purchaser at the short sale without notice of the recorded lien and no ACTUAL notice of the lien’s existence takes title free of the lien.

So this is good news… except…

As a Real Estate licensee, now I have reason to know that this 3rd lien exists, and I am bound to disclose this information to a prospective buyer. I suppose if the seller had not told me about it, things would be different, but I must disclose this information to the buyer, and to the title company; Title likely will not insure the transaction without a sign off from the 3rd, and they will go attempt to locate and talk to the lien holder as part of their title search process.

Ultimately the rules are there to protect buyers, and they work reasonably well.

–PLH

You can’t get financing right after a foreclosure or bankruptcy, can you?

Maybe. At least that’s the stock answer. There are some circumstances that can work out quite well for some people.

Let’s suppose you are at least 62 years old, and for some reason had to declare bankruptcy, or you got foreclosed, or both. And let’s also suppose that somehow you have a little cash, say 30k-40k put away. Can you buy a house?

Probably! A maligned mortgage option called a reverse mortgage, might work for you. Usually a reverse is used when an older (62+) person has equity in their home, and they want cash. The reverse mortgage lets them get cash out, but not the entire value, and the house reverts to the mortgage company when the owner passes away.

I just sold a home to a friend of mine, and he put about a third of the value of the home down in cash, and got a reverse mortgage for the other two thirds. He doesn’t have to make any payments, although he can, if he wants to ultimately leave the house to someone, or, if real estate values rise dramatically, he can pay off the reverse and sell the house, and keep the profits. Not a bad deal.

The amount and rates are based on the actuarial tables. And it is a much better deal than renting! Just another option for buying a home.

Read Your Contract – Don’t Weep!

In 2006, the Thomases contracted to buy a fine new luxury residence at the Montelucia Villas. The contract called for 3 earnest money deposits totalling almost $660 thousand towards the $3.3 Million purchase price. Montelucia sent the Thomases a letter saying it would be prepared to close on May 16, 2008. The Thomases informed Montelucia on May 6, 2008 that they would not perform because of various reasons including Montelucia’s failure to get a certificate of occupancy for the residence. Their letter demanded return of the earnest money. Didn’t happen; and the Thomases sued for its return. The trial court found Thomases were entitled to a refund, but the Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed in THOMAS V. MONTELUCIA VILLAS, LLC (filed March 27, 2012 as no. 1 CA-CV 10-0761).

The Court of Appeals reviewed the contract and concluded that the Thomases’ jumped the gun, because Montelucia had until May 16, 2012 to perform, including obtaining the necessary occupancy certificate. The Court found that at the date of the May 6th letter, Montelucia had not breached the purchase agreement and that its time for performance had not arisen. In other words, the Thomases’ act of declaring the contract “over” was an anticipatory rupudiation of their obligations which rendered the buyers liable. Wait a second, said the Thomases. That’s only true if Montelucia had the ability to perform as Seller under the contract by May 16th.

Wrong, said the Court of Appeals. Once the Thomases repudiated the contract on May 6th, Montelucia was not obligated to get the occupancy certificate or to do anything more under the contract. Problem was, Section 12 of the contract was very specific about defaults and cure periods. The Thomases needed to give Montelucia written notice of its failure to perform, and then allow Montelucia a period of time to cure its deficient performance. Instead, the Thomases just said “it’s over” – walking away from its obligations. The Court found that the May 6th letter unequivocally repudiated the contract – meaning the Thomases refused to perform it any further. So, ironically, the party who believed it was the victim was the party that breached the contract by repudiating its terms.

If you want the other party to perform its contract obligations, you have to read the default provision and follow its instructions to the letter (pun intended). Otherwise, you cannot suspend your performance, and you sure can’t declare the contract terminated. The Thomases gave the Montelucia an opportunity to avoid its obligatuions just because they didn’t give the proper notice and chance to cure to Montelucia. Words in contract text are pretty much interpreted as set forth. Don’t act in haste – then you won’t have occasion to weep, like the Thomases likely did when they read this opinion..

Of Bulk Real Estate Deals

The internet is full of people trying to teach others how to do bulk property deals. I thought it sounded interesting, so I have listened to a few of the webinars about these deals. Mostly the information is vaguely accurate, based on someone maybe doing one deal, and is deceptive, in my experience.

I have had several sellers who had multiple properties to sell (more than 20) in a single transaction, and I have talked with lots of buyers (working with one right now) who want to buy many properties.

Here is what I have learned: If you have someone call you because you mentioned that you have a seller of bulk properties, first make sure they are licensed, or are the end buyer. There are many “intermediaries” who think they can take a real estate commission without a real estate license and get really angry when you refuse to work with them. I have had lengthy conversations with some of these people, they insist that the rules do not apply in bulk deals. Really? Every state I have checked has a law similar to the Arizona statute that says that any individual receiving compensation in furtherance of a real estate transaction is acting as a real estate broker, and a license is required.

Second, if you ever give up the list of homes you have to sell, they will end up all over the internet and at some point, if you are on the right mailing list, someone will try to sell them to you as if they own them. I send the home information, but I encode some information in the list of homes so I know exactly who got the list. Then if it shows up on the internet, we have a conversation.

Most of the time, the “buyers” that approached me for my bulk homes were people trying to resell the properties, as this is what the webinars all teach. Get a funding source and flip the properties in escrow. Sure, this can be done. However if you are trying to buy my set of bulk properties, I need proof of funds from a BANK not some company, and you better submit a purchase contract naming an in-state title company, and there had better be substantial earnest money, and enough of it non-refundable to pay for the title work. (A title company will do free title work if a deal falls through for 1 property; they will not do it for a block of 200 homes. If the deal falls through, the title company wants money.)

Most people claiming to have a block of properties to sell, don’t. Most people claiming to be buyers of bulk properties, aren’t.

Unfortunately there are way too many scam artists out there and not enough bulk deals.

“Sometimes, You Get What You Need”

The Court of Appeals last month in BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING LP v SEMPER INVESTMENTS (March 22, 2012), gave additional guidance on the rules and boundaries of equitable subrogation where lienholders dispute each other’s priority position to be paid,

Russo defaulted on a loan from Semper, triggering that lender’s trustee’s sale. BAC sued for an injunction to prevent Semper’s trustee’s sale and for a declaration that BAC’s loan had priority position. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of BAC, concluding that BAC’s loan had first priority under the doctrine of equitable subrogation and that Semper’s loan was in second place. Semper appealed. The Court of Appeals held that equitable subrogation applied and that Semper failed to identify any genuine issue of material fact to merit a different result.

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, a subsequent lender who applies funds to a “primary and superior encumbrance” can be substituted “in the priority position of the primary lienholder, despite the recording of an intervening lien.” The doctrine may apply if, among other requirements, intervening claimants do not suffer prejudice. Semper argued all sorts of factors would cause it prejudice if BAC was declared senior to its lien, but to no avail. First, Semper argued that subrogation would be prejudicial because the new loan with BAC had a different interest rate than the earlier 2004 First Magnus loan which was assigned to Semper and the 2005 home equity loan. The Countrywide/ BAC loan had a fixed interest rate, and the subrogated loans had variable rates which could be lower than the fixed rate.

Second, other differences in loan terms and conditions increased the cost of the new loan. Semper claimed that in these circumstances, Russo was more likely to default under the new BAC loan than the original loans, thereby prejudicing Semper’s ability to be repaid. The Court explained that higher interest rates for the later loan could affect subrogation. For example, a much higher rate would increase the amount of the first-priority loan at a trustee’s sale, thus reducing the amount the intervening, second-priority lienholder could recover from the sale. But, citing the Restatement Third of Property dealing with mortgages, the Court held that because the original loans to Russo had a variable interest rate and the new loan’s fixed-rate is within the variable “range,” there was no prejudice sufficient to overcome the doctrine of subrogation.

BAC reminded the Court that Semper (its predecessor, really) had considered and accepted the risk of a higher rate because the variable rate of the original loan could be substantially higher than the new fixed rate.

The Court also affirmed that “notice is not an element of equitable subrogation under Arizona law” citing Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage. Corp., 208 Ariz. 478, 95 P.3d 542, 548 (App. 2004). The relevant inquiry for the Court was whether “actual prejudice to an intervening lienholder” occurred, not whether notice might have caused the intervening lienholder to behave differently. Interestingly, the Court said that BAC’s priority under the equitable subrogation doctrine extended only to those funds BAC supplied “to satisfy the priority liens,” and any funds reducing those liens obtained from other sources were not to be used to BAC’s credit.

Anti-Deficiency Protection After Judicial Foreclosure

On March 20th the Arizona Court of Appeals filed an opinion and what sure appeared like an appeal of its own in the case of HELVETICA SERVICING, INC. vs. PASQUAN, Division One, Department C (2012 WL 925566, March 20, 2012). The Court of Appeals ruled that sometimes a lender can have a deficiency judgment following a judicial foreclosure, if and to the extent it can be proven that some of the funds advanced that were not repaid went to items that were not to retire proceeds of purchase money lending by a previous lender. Pasquan’s borrowing history was complicated but ultimately the couple’s borrowing was used in part to pay taxes, utilities, new home improvements and landscaping, among other things.

The Court of Appeals asked the fundamental question whether in a refinancing the non-purchase money portion of a loan can be segregated so as to permit the foreclosing lender to seek recovery of these amounts if there is a deficiency following the auction of the property. The Court explained that there are policy reasons to disallow deficiency actions against lenders, in general. Those reasons include discouraging lender over-valuation of property, preventing financial ruin and “protecting refinancing transactions.” (Would that we could advance the policy to discourage over-valuations of potential borrowers’ capacity to repay – but I digress.)

The Court of Appeals ultimately held that for the policy reasons cited above, the risk of inadequate security should fall on purchase money lenders, and that purchase money loans will include any loan, even a construction loan, in which a residence falls within the statutory boundaries of A.R.S. Sec. 33-729(A) and the deed of trust securing the loan covers the land and the dwelling unit on it. However, the Court held that in a judicial foreclosure, the portion of the loan proceeds not used in construction or refinancing of the original purchase money loan may be segregated and therefore the lender may “pursue a deficiency judgment for the latter amounts.”

Well, I’m having trouble getting my head around that decision. There’s only one total sum due under a note, and although its use may be allocated to different functions, there’s only one monthly (usually) payment made. So, if there’s a borrower default, which dollars didn’t get repaid – the purchase money dollars or the “non purchase money sums?” Does one set of dollars get paid first? Or do you just do a division problem and say, “well, since a quarter of your loan didn’t go to purchase money purposes, and then you defaulted when you still owed half the total loan amount, then the lender can pursue you for one-eighth of the amount that is not recovered via the sheriff’s sale?”

That makes my head hurt, so I’m guessing it was no accident that this is the last sentence of the opinion: “If the legislature disagrees with our resolution of this admittedly murky issue, we presume it will amend the existing statutory scheme to make clear its intentions.” So, if A.R.S. Sec. 33-729 didn’t make clear that the lender takes nothing by way of deficiency, to the Court’s plea for clarity, I add “amen.”

KAZ Your Mechanic’s Lien’s Not Valid – That’s Why!

There’s distractions impairing my posting tendencies of late. I’m going to get caught up here this week, perhaps. Here’s a case of mild interest decided by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Tucson a month ago, called KAZ CONSTRUCTION V. NEWPORT EQUITY PARTNERS. The Superior Court had ruled a deed of trust was invalid and therefore that Kaz’s mechanic’s lien was in first position as an encumbrance against the property. The Strohbachs, who thought they had a deed of trust lien on the property, were displeased, and the Court of Appeals weighed in.

The issue with the deed of trust is that the property was itself owned by a Title Agency Trust. The Strohbachs loaned Zanderholm almost $2 Million to fund improvements to the property that Kaz made some of. That purpose was set forth in the deed of trust itself. Problem is that only the Title Agency Trust had the sole right to encumber the property, according to the terms of that trust. The Court of Appeals noted further that Zanderholm could not encumber the property unless the Trust first conveyed legal title to Mr. Z. So the appeals court found that the trial judge was correct – no interest in the property was conveyed by Mr. Z to the Strohbachs by the deed of trust.

Nonetheless, the Strohbachs contended that months before the Kaz 20-day preliminary notice period began, they recorded the deed of trust, effectively rendering them construction lenders to Mr. Z. As such, they contended, they were “reputed construction lenders” entitled to a 20-day notice under the Mechanic’s Lien statutes. The appeals court found that even an invalid lien of someone making a construction loan was sufficient to define a person as a “reputed construction lender”. (Here the court was aided by the omission of any definition of that term in Arizona’s case law or statutes.) The court further noted that even an invalid lien, if recorded, can provide constructive notice to a mechanic or materialman so as to inform the contractor upon whom a 20-day preliminary notice must be served. Since the Strohbachs were not given the 20-day notice, KAZ’s lien was invalid where they were concerned; thus, the Strohbachs were not going to be foreclosed out by KAZ.

Wowser – the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the trial judge “for further proceedings consistent with” its decision. What further proceedings?! One presumes that the further proceedings will require KAZ to give the Strohbachs notice of its inention to foreclose (notice it already has, of course) to give the latter a chance to pay KAZ what it’s owed as reflected in its Notice and Claim of Lien, thereby preventing the loss of traction of the Strohbachs’ invalid lien? Sometimes, the Court of Appeals needs to remand to the trial court with a road map of “coming events.” Practice tip for deed of trust drafting lawyers, do-it-yerselfers and title insurance agency employees: Don’t record anything until you have confirmed fee title ownership of the collateral real property.  And for mechanics and materialmen: Get a title commitment; and then give everyone in the resulting list of  title liens notice, whether or not you think the liens in the commitment are (or ought to be) valid encumbrances on the property you seek to foreclose upon.  Don’t look behind the curtain; an extra certified mailing is worth the cost.